I read Bostock v. Clayton County after someone recommended it as an example of a well-written Gorsuch opinion. It concerns whether or not sexual orientation is protected against discrimination by Title 7 of The Civil Rights Act of 1964.
At first blush, I would have said that Title 7 does not cover sexual orientation — that the clear meaning of “sex” was biologically male or female — and the law is intended to prevent discrimination against women.
Yet you have to concede Gorsuch’s point: that if you fire a man for having sex with men but not a woman for having sex with men, then that termination of employment is based on the employee’s sex.
I feel like the intent of the Civil Rights Act is that you ought not fire someone based on the type of person they are, but must consider them as individuals, and that the Gorsuch opinion is consistent with that.
Alito’s dissent, which I skimmed, struck me as emotional and testy. I noticed that both Alito and Gorsuch referred to the dictionary a fair amount and was reminded this court has somewhat of a reputation for hair-splitting.
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