Paraphrasing Heidegger’s expressed thought;
Why might I think Heidegger’s “True Meaning” is different from Heidegger’s “Expressed Thought”;
(What about his expressed thought, in translation, has suggested something more true that is unexpressed)
(What is it about the reader, myself, that is dissatisfied with the thought as expressed in translation, believes there’s ‘something more to it.’)
(The sense is it can be made more succinct and in being made more succinct being made also more true.)
How is it that I sense, when paraphrasing Heidegger’s expressed thought, I’m saying more than he would have? (In being more succinct have I left something important out?)
How (when paraphrasing Heidegger’s thought) do I differentiate between a thought that is interesting because it is a new thought to me, “an interesting idea”, and a thought that is interesting because it is indeed Heidegger’s (I’ve succeeded in expressing otherwise Heidegger’s thought) and a thought that is interesting because it is an especially interesting idea of Heidegger’s;
(As I say, dealing not with Heidegger nor with Heidegger’s thought nor with Heidegger’s expressed thought but with a published translation of his expressed published thought.)
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(A minor or basic observation about Heidegger’s “published expressed thought” is that to get at being, as he understands it, requires a scholastic enterprise, and scholarly apparatus, — one can’t get at being by merely being by say ‘meditating.’)
That is, reading is required; meditation is not so much required.
(In the experience of being isn’t the answer to the meaning of being. One couldn’t describe being by “being truly” and then describing what it was…. One has to understand being to be? The concept of being must be understood before the thing itself can? Being must involve the history of its concept?)
One rather needs ontology as it has come down through written history –through tradition– Aristotle, The Scholacists, Descartes, Kant — in fact, H. expressly states the necessity of tradition in the understanding of one’s ‘historicity’.)
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